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TITLE:  CROATIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995

                            CROATIA


Three years after the Republic of Croatia declared
independence, one-quarter of its land continued to be occupied
by rebel Serbs.  No progress was made in 1994 in implementing
the Vance Peace Plan, and the United Nations Protective Force
(UNPROFOR) continued its peacekeeping activities in four U.N.
protected areas (UNPA's).  A March cease-fire created a
2-kilometer-wide zone of separation and led to a dramatic
decrease in violence.  In December the Government and the rebel
Serbs agreed upon a package of economic and confidence-building
measures, the implementation of which began with the opening of
the Zagreb-Belgrade highway to civilian traffic on December 21.

Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with a
powerful presidency.  President Franjo Tudjman, elected in
1992, serves as Head of State and commander in chief of the
armed forces, chairs the influential National Defense and
Security Council, and appoints the Prime Minister, who leads
the Government.  President Tudjman's party, the Croatian
Democratic Union (HDZ), holds the majority of seats in both
houses of Parliament.  Government influence weakens the
nominally independent judiciary.  The enormous constitutional
powers of the presidency, the military occupation of large
sections of the country, and the overwhelming dominance of one
political party tend to stifle the expression of diverse views.

The Ministry of Defense oversees the military, while the
Ministry of the Interior oversees the police.  Both police and
military personnel were responsible for abuses, including
physical abuse of prisoners and detainees.

In the Serb-controlled UNPA's, the well-armed police and
military forces of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbian
Krajina" ("RSK") continued their pattern of egregious human
rights abuses against both Serbs and non-Serbs, including
physical violence and "ethnic cleansing."  Of the 44,000 Croats
who before the conflict lived in what is now UNPA Sector South,
only 800 to 900 remain.  In Sector North, only 1,000 Croats of
an original population of 112,000 remain.

Croatia has a mixed economy in which industry is largely state
owned, and agriculture is mostly in private hands.  The
Government's stabilization program, introduced in 1993,
continued to keep inflation low, but little progress was made
on either privatization or free market reforms.  The continuing
division of the country, the massive refugee problem, and the
threat of renewed war all limited economic recovery.

While the use of violence by security forces against Serbs in
government-controlled areas declined, cases of disappearance
and harassment continued near the frontline areas.  Ethnic
Serbs continued to suffer from ever-present, subtle, and
sometimes open discrimination in such areas as the
administration of justice, employment, housing, and the free
exercise of their cultural rights.  In fewer numbers than in
previous years, Serbs were also victims of anonymous threats,
vandalism, and--more rarely--physical attacks.  Many Serbs left
Croatia during the year as a result of the combined economic
discrimination and physical threats, although the total number
was impossible to determine.  The Government made only token
efforts to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of the more
egregious abuses committed in 1992 and 1993 and continued to
discriminate against non-Croats in the granting of
citizenship.  Early in the year, the Government also
discriminated against Muslim refugees from Bosnia, using
arbitrary detention and forced repatriation.

In the Serb-controlled portions of the UNPA's, there was no
improvement in the human rights situation.  The police and
military forces of the "RSK" continued to use violence,
intimidation, harassment, and displacement against nonethnic
Serbs to achieve the goal of ethnic cleansing.  All residents
were subjected to a totally controlled legal system operating
in an atmosphere without any of the basic human rights of
freedom of expression, assembly, press, religion, movement, or
the right to change their government.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no substantiated reports of politically motivated or
other extrajudicial killings in government-controlled parts of
Croatia.  However, opposition and human rights groups
criticized the failure of Croatian authorities to bring to
justice the parties responsible for several cases from previous
years, particularly those of Serbs killed in 1991 and 1992.
Those allegedly implicated in the killings include personnel in
the Defense and Interior Ministries, but the Government
insisted the charges were baseless.

Reports of political killings in the Serb-occupied UNPA's also
decreased, although a disproportionate number of homicide
victims in the "RSK" were non-Serbs.  More than one-third of
the reported 68 homicide victims in the Serb-controlled UNPA's
were non-Serbs, according to local (Serbian) police.  Out of an
estimated remaining Croatian population in Serb-controlled
territory of perhaps 4,000, 16 ethnic Croats (or one out of
every 250) were murdered during the year.  Serbian forces
allegedly committed several murders along the confrontation
line, including the mass murder of five men in May in Sector
West, and the killing of a fisherman near the Dalmatian coast
in August.  Police apprehended no suspects.  A Dutch citizen
fighting in the Croatian armed forces died while in custody of
Serbian forces several days after his capture near the front
lines in April.

Serbian obstructionism continued to block the excavation of the
mass grave sites in the UNPA's.  In the case of the mass grave
of presumed murdered Serbs exhumed in Sector West in October
1993, the Croatian Government has still not brought any charges.

     b.  Disappearance

There were few new cases of disappearances reported.  At year's
end, the Government reported more than 2,500 cases of missing
persons still unresolved from the 1991-1992 war.  This figure
was down from over 7,000 cases at the beginning of the year.
Progress was made in removing names from the list of the
missing as a result of prisoner and body exchanges.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel or degrading
punishment, but government forces continued to commit such
abuses.  There were credible reports that security forces
frequently beat and mistreated prisoners during detention and
interrogation, particularly early in the year.  The best
documented cases typically involved Serbian or Muslim
prisoners.  Helsinki Watch indicated in February that the
authorities at Lora prison in Split had engaged in the torture
and beating of prisoners who were former Yugoslav National Army
(JNA) reservists.  Six Serbs captured in early July, however,
who the Croats claim had infiltrated across the front lines,
reported no beatings or mistreatment to the European Community
Monitoring Mission which visited them.

Detention facilities generally meet accepted standards of
cleanliness, nutrition, and amenities.  Jails are crowded, but
not to excess, and family visits and access to counsel are
available.

Prison conditions in the Serb-controlled UNPA's, however, are
reliably reported to be abysmal.  Harsh treatment of non-Serbs
is commonplace, and the Serbian "authorities" do not punish
abusers.  Two journalists who were detained in December by
local police and paramilitary forces were beaten, as well as
subjected to psychological torture, such as death threats.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Constitution contains provisions to protect the legal
rights of all accused, but the Government does not respect
these rights in practice.  The Government frequently abuses
pretrial and investigative detention.  Most cases of arbitrary
arrest or detention involved Muslim residents and refugees in
Croatia early in the year, while Croatian and Bosnian
government troops were fighting in neighboring Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  There were no large-scale police sweeps nor
attempted forced repatriations such as took place in late 1993,
but refugee organizations continued to report instances in
which police arbitrarily detained Muslim refugees from Bosnia
and Herzegovina and threatened them with forcible expulsion.

Police normally seek arrest warrants by presenting evidence of
probable cause to an interrogating magistrate.  Police may
arrest a suspect without a warrant if they believe he might
flee, destroy evidence, or commit other crimes.  If police
arrest a suspect without a warrant, they have 24 hours in which
to justify their decision before the local interrogating
magistrate.

After arrest, persons must be given access to an attorney of
their choice within 24 hours; if they have no attorney, the
interrogating magistrate will appoint one from a list of public
defenders.  The interrogating judge must, within 3 days of the
arrest, decide whether sufficient cause exists to hold the
arrestee in custody, pending further investigation.  The judge
must justify the decision in writing, including the length of
detention ordered.  These decisions may be appealed, either
immediately or later during the detention period.  The usual
period of investigative detention varies from a few days to a
few weeks but by law may be as long as 2 years.  Accused
persons have the right to have their attorney present during
the entire investigation as well as during any appeal of
investigative detention.  While this is typically the case,
there were instances in which detainees did not have adequate
access to legal counsel.

In practice, arrestees are almost always bound over for
investigation unless it is clear no case against them exists.
Once the investigation is complete, persons are usually
released on their own recognizance pending trial, unless the
crime is a major offense or the accused is considered a public
danger.  There are no provisions for posting bail, although
police will sometimes retain the accused's passport to prevent
him from leaving the country.

In the Serb-controlled areas of the UNPA's, virtually no
safeguards exist against arbitrary detention, and Serbian
forces continued to use detention to intimidate non-Serbs.
Many cases involved residents of the Bihac pocket in western
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had to transit Serb-held territory
to reach the outside world.  In August Serbian forces arrested
a Catholic priest as he fled the fighting in the Bihac pocket
and held him for several weeks without charge before his
release could be negotiated.  Serbian forces also commonly
arrested Croatian civilians in the separation zone created by
the March cease-fire agreement, charging that they were
illegally attempting to enter the "RSK."

The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The legal system consists of municipal and district courts, a
Supreme Court, and a Constitutional Court.  The High Judicial
Council (with a president and 14 members from all parts of the
legal community) appoints judges and public prosecutors.
Judicial tenure is permanent.  The House of Counties nominates
persons for membership on the High Judicial Council, and the
House of Representatives elects members to 8-year terms.  The
11 judges of the Constitutional Court are elected to 8-year
terms in the same manner.

The judicial process is not free of ethnic bias or political
influence.  The Government has not yet established the
Provisional Court of Human Rights, mandated by a 1992
constitutional law on minorities.  The emergency measures
established in 1991 are still being applied, despite a number
of appeals by the U.N. Special Rapporteur that these be
abolished.  The orders provide for the suspension of certain
remedies in legal proceedings and give the six-court military
legal system jurisdiction over a large number of cases
involving civilians.

Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair
trial and a variety of due process rights in both civilian and
military courts, in practice, the prosecuting attorney has
leeway in deciding whether to bring a case against an
individual, and, in cases considered "political," both the
indictment and the conduct of trials are sometimes subject to
outside influence.  In the case of nine members of the
Dalmatian Action Party arrested on suspicion of having plotted
the bombing of their own political party offices in September
1993, the local military court took jurisdiction.  Two trial
sessions were held, the latest in April.  Observers believe
that, as the case looked increasingly weak, the prosecution
decided to suspend action.  The prosecution did not dismiss the
charges, however, which observers decried as an attempt to keep
the defendants in legal limbo in order to hamper their
political activities.

The legal system in the Serb-controlled UNPA's remained a sham,
with its procedures and practices increasingly open to outside
interference by those in power.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

The Constitution declares the home inviolable.  Only a court
may issue a search warrant, stating the justification for the
search of a home or other premises.  Police may enter a home
without a warrant or the owner's consent only if necessary to
enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or prevent
serious danger to life or important property.  In practice, the
authorities often failed to adhere to these constitutional
requirements.

Military or civil police carried out evictions by force,
involving several hundred families, ethnic Serbs and Croats as
well as Muslims.  In Split, 230 families were reported to be
seeking through the courts to remove soldiers who had seized
their apartments.  Almost all of these cases involved
apartments previously owned by the JNA, over which the Ministry
of Defense asserted ownership.  Referring to property laws
which remove tenancy rights as a result of any 6-month absence
or if the tenant is ruled to have acted against the interests
of Croatia, the Ministry of Defense granted soldiers tenancy of
occupied flats.  The soldiers then frequently took residences
by force of arms, either evicting the current tenants or
forcing them to cohabitate.

During the year, human rights organizations became increasingly
effective at calling public attention to forced evictions, and
their members turned up in large numbers at the announced time
of the eviction.  But in at least two cases, police beat and
injured human rights monitors seeking to obstruct an eviction.
In May the Defense Ministry issued public orders to remove any
soldiers who had illegally forced their way into an apartment,
using force if necessary.  But military police never carried
out these orders, reporting privately to observers that their
commanders had told them to refrain from arresting the
soldiers.  The tenants of these apartments were typically
Serbian families or the spouses and children of Serbs in the
JNA who had left Croatia.  At a July 12 press conference,
President Tudjman justified the forced evictions by linking
them to the Serbian aggression against Croatia and eviction of
one-quarter million Croats.

The Constitution guarantees the secrecy and safety of personal
data, but it was unclear if such guarantees were adhered to in
practice.

Serbian authorities in the UNPA's showed no compunction about
interfering with the privacy rights of the inhabitants of those
areas, particularly non-Serbs.  UNPROFOR continued to provide
24-hour patrols of several minority villages to protect the
inhabitants from armed bands.  The practice of forcibly moving
Serbian refugees or soldiers into the homes of non-Serb
residents continued as well, which was clearly designed to
pressure the non-Serbs to leave.  One couple in Sector West was
forced to live in their pantry after Serbian soldiers took over
the remainder of the house and Serbian refugees moved into
their outbuildings.  Inhabitants were even denied the right to
talk on the telephone, with the authorities putting severe
restrictions on international observers who provided mobile
telephones to villagers during visits to permit them to call
relatives on the other side of the line.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
         Law in Internal Conflicts

On March 29, the Government and the leadership of the "RSK"
signed a comprehensive cease-fire agreement in Zagreb, the
capital, which successfully reduced the amount of shelling to
almost zero and the number of shooting incidents by about
99 percent.  There were only a handful of fatalities during the
year from shooting incidents involving cease-fire violations.
However, occasional shelling did occur from Bosnian Serb
positions bordering Croatia, most commonly onto the Slavonian
city of Zupanja and onto the area around the Dubrovnik
airport.  These attacks caused substantial property damage but
no reported fatalities.

In October and November, the "RSK" military began a
concentrated campaign of bombardment and ground attacks against
the territory held by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in a region known as the Bihac pocket.  The Krajina Serbs
coordinated these attacks with Bosnian Serb and rebel Muslim
forces.  The bombings included both artillery and air attacks
and were frequently directed against civilian population
centers such as Bihac town, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa.  Targets
included the civilian hospital in Bihac.  Numerous civilian
casualties resulted from the attacks.  In addition, the "RSK"
used restriction of humanitarian aid as a weapon against the
population of the Bihac pocket, completely shutting off access
to government-controlled portions of the pocket for U.N. aid
convoys from May until late December.

With small steps toward normalization along the confrontation
line under the March 25 cease-fire, the extent of previous
mine-laying during the conflict was increasingly evident.
UNPROFOR troops, as well as soldiers and civilians from both
sides, were victims of unmarked and uncleared minefields.  A
particularly dangerous situation arose in August when the
forces of Bosnian Muslim rebel leader Fikret Abdic were
defeated by the Bosnian army and tens of thousands of people
left the Bihac pocket, forcing their way into the separation
zone to demand entry into government-controlled Croatia.  The
Government refused to grant entry, and the refugees refused to
turn back and leave the heavily mined area.  Despite efforts by
UNPROFOR to clear the immediate area of mines, several refugees
were injured by mine explosions.

Croatian citizens, originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
reported that the Government forcibly mobilized them to fight
in the Bosnian Croat paramilitary forces during the first few
months of the year.

For 5 weeks in the summer, Croats displaced from the Serb-
occupied areas of Croatia blocked all checkpoints into the
UNPA's, protesting the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR in
reintegrating the occupied territories into Croatia and in
assisting the return of the displaced to their homes.  They
also accused UNPROFOR of supplying the Serbs with
nonhumanitarian supplies, including fuel.  UNPROFOR accused the
Government of being behind the blockades and violating its
international legal obligations.  While it was not clear that
the Government actually organized the blockades, the protesters
clearly enjoyed government sympathy and support.  After the
Government negotiated an inspection procedure to verify that
UNPROFOR personnel were not transporting any contraband into
the UNPA's, the blockade was lifted.

In the Serb-occupied UNPA's, expulsions, in the form of ethnic
cleansing, continued to be used aggressively and with the
blessing of local "officials" against Croats, Hungarians,
Slovaks, Czechs, and other non-Serbs.  Throughout the year
UNPROFOR and other international agencies organized the transit
of a slow but steady stream of non-Serbs out of the UNPA's.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of thought and
expression, specifically including freedom of the press and
other media of communication, speech, and public expression,
and free establishment of institutions of public
communication.  In practice, government influence on the media
through state ownership of most print and broadcast outlets
limits these freedoms.  In addition, government intimidation
induces self-censorship.  Politicians, political activists, and
journalists are often reluctant to criticize the Government in
public forums for fear of harassment, job loss, intimidation,
or being labeled a traitor to war-torn Croatia.

The Government controls all national television broadcasting
and all but one national radio station, and retains a
controlling interest in two of four news dailies and some
weeklies.  The sale of a majority of shares in the leading
newspaper, Vjesnik, to a local bank appeared to increase rather
than reduce government influence at the paper.  The chairman of
the bank's board of directors is an HDZ Member of Parliament,
and the editor in chief of the paper was replaced in December
by a less experienced journalist, who despite claiming no party
affiliation, had close links with the HDZ.  Although these
state-controlled or heavily state-influenced media,
particularly the press, frequently carry reportage critical of
the Government, government control nonetheless ensures an
overall editorial slant generally favorable to the Government
and the HDZ.  Each of the opposition parties is allocated 4
minutes of television time per week.  Access to the print media
is minimal, with occasional coverage of press conferences and
interviews.  Two nationally publicized instances of physical
threats against journalists by local politicians generated
media debate but no action by the Government.

A few newspapers continue to guard their independence,
including the daily Novi List in Rijeka, the weekly Globus, the
intellectual bimonthly journal Erasmus, the satirical weekly
Feral Tribune, and the weekly Arkzin, published by "the Antiwar
Campaign."  A new weekly, Pecat, with an independent editorial
line began publishing in September.  Even some extremist
publications, with a virulently antigovernment slant, could be
purchased at newsstands, although they had very small
circulation.  The highly popular Feral Tribune, whose material
continued to push the boundaries of good taste, was
reclassified for tax purposes as a pornographic magazine and,
therefore, subject to a 50-percent turnover tax.  The Minister
of Culture admitted that this reclassification was a result of
Feral's continuing attacks on the Government.  International
papers and journals remained available throughout
government-controlled areas, including Serbian periodicals
which subscribers continued to receive by mail.

Croatia has four major television channels, as well as regional
stations in Zadar, Split, Vinkovci, and Osijek.  Zagreb-based
Channels One, Two, and Four are part of the official Croatian
Radio and Television enterprise (HTV), headed by a well-known
HDZ member.  Zagreb Channel Three, OTV-youth television, with a
signal that reaches only the capital district, has an uncertain
legal status and operates at the sufferance of the Government.

Parliament in July passed a broadcasting law providing for the
allocation of radio and television frequencies to new, private
outlets, but the Government has not yet implemented it.
Private local radio stations operate under provisional licenses
in Croatia, but their legal status is open to question until
the media law is implemented.  The broadcasting law mandates
that one parliamentary member of the Council for Croatian
Television be a minority representative, but this person has
not yet been appointed.  A seven-member council of government
and nongovernmental representatives, established by Parliament
in 1993 to protect the freedom of the press, has yet to meet
because Parliament failed to appoint a chairman until late in
the year.

In the Serb-controlled portions of the UNPA's, freedom of
speech and press virtually does not exist.  With martial law
still in effect, there are no guarantees of press and other
freedoms, and the authorities control the tone and content of
the media.  Serbian papers, usually published in Belgrade, are
generally available, although the supply is sometimes
sporadic.  There is one small paper published weekly or
biweekly in Serbian in Sector North.

A few low-powered local radio "stations" broadcast from
Serb-held territory in some of the UNPA's, and Croatian radio
and television signals are received in these areas as well.
The Serbian Television Krajina, whose studios are in Petrova
Gora and Knin, broadcasts daily.  Two other Serbian mobile
studios operate out of Beli Manastir and Plitvice.

Academic freedom is generally respected in Croatia.  However,
there is apprehension within the academic community concerning
the centralizing effects on faculty and programs of the
university reform law.  When it became apparent that the new
government Council for Higher Education could not review all
the revised academic programs prior to the start of the 1994-95
school year, the Government delayed introduction of the new
curriculums.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides that all citizens have the right to
peaceful assembly and association for the protection of
citizens' interests or the promotion of social, economic,
political, national, cultural, and other convictions and
objectives.  Citizens may freely form, join, and leave
political parties, trade unions, and other associations.  In
practice, the rights of peaceful assembly and association are
respected in Croatia.  The Government requires permits for
rallies but grants them routinely.  Political parties, refugee
associations, women's groups, and others held peaceful rallies
and demonstrations without hindrance or incident.  These
gatherings included events which both supported and criticized
government policies.  All citizens enjoyed these rights,
including members of the Serbian and Muslim communities.

In Serb-controlled areas, however, these rights were not
respected.  In the fall, local media reported that several men
were arrested in the Serb-held town of Benkovac when they
protested a recent military mobilization by local Serbian
authorities.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

There is no state religion.  The Constitution provides for
freedom of conscience and religion and free public profession
of religious and other convictions.  All religious communities
are free to conduct public services and to open and run social
and charitable institutions.  Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodox Christianity, and Islam are the major faiths in
Croatia, and there is also an active Jewish community.  The
majority of practicing Croats are Roman Catholic, and the
Government provides an option of Catholic religious education
in schools.

There are no formal restrictions on religious groups.  The main
mosque in Croatia is in Zagreb, where it serves not only as a
religious center but also as a social aid office for the large
Bosnian Muslim refugee population.  Croatian Protestants from a
number of denominations, as well as foreign clergy, actively
practice and proselytize.  Some foreign religious organizations
seeking to provide social services reported bureaucratic
obstacles to their establishment in Croatia, but it was unclear
if this had any connection to their religious character.  A
Baptist church seeking to purchase property for a new church
site also reported problems receiving the necessary approvals.

The close identification of religion with ethnicity had earlier
caused religious institutions to be targets of violence.  The
investigation into the bombing of the Serbian Orthodox eparchy
in Karlovac on December 24, 1993, led to no arrests.  During
the night of December 20, a bomb exploded inside the Orthodox
church of the eastern Slavonian city of Osijek, causing some
damage.  Police have not arrested any suspects.  The Serbian
Orthodox Cathedral in downtown Zagreb remained open, and
several other Orthodox churches and monasteries operated freely
in government-controlled Croatia.  Although the majority of
Orthodox clergy left at the start of the war in 1991, a few
priests and nuns, most of them retired, remained to carry out
religious duties.  International human rights monitors said
these clergy reported generally good relations with their
Catholic neighbors.